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ABSTRACT: This  paper  argues  against  the  common  practice  of  presenting  perdurantism, 
endurantism, and other views about persistence and time as solutions to an alleged puzzle 
about change. Different recent attempts to generate a puzzle about change are examined 
and  found  unsuccessful.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  relevant  views  about 
persistence and time are not well motivated, but rather that their interest and purpose is 
independent of their suitability for solving the alleged puzzle.
In the contemporary literature on persistence through time, it is customary to present  
particular  versions  of  endurantism  and  perdurantism  (as  well  as  other  theories  of  
persistence, as I will generically call them) as primarily intended to solve a certain puzzle 
about change. More generally, the idea that change is a deeply puzzling phenomenon is a 
common  assumption  among  philosophers:  how  can  one  and  the  same  object  have 
incompatible properties? Nothing can have incompatible properties at the same time; how 
does having them at different times help? I will argue, however, that contrary to what is so 
generally assumed, there is no real puzzle about change – at least not one that could serve 
as a motivation for theories of persistence. Moreover, the pretension that there is such a 
puzzle can hardly be justified on heuristic grounds, as a useful means for presenting or 
motivating the different theories of persistence. As I will argue, this pretension is rather 
pernicious, since it obscures some actual motivations for theories of persistence.  I want to 
emphasize  at  the  outset  that  by  undermining  this  standard  way  in  which  theories  of 
persistence are  motivated,  I  do not  intend to  dismiss  these  theories,  or  to  belittle  their 
interest. On the contrary, my argument is perfectly compatible with the view that theories of  
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persistence are independently well-motivated, and that their interest does not depend on 
there being a puzzle about change for them to solve. 
This is the plan for what follows: in section 1, I survey different recent attempts to 
generate  a  puzzle  about  change  and  argue  that  they  are  unsuccessful.  In  section  2,  I 
consider David Lewis’s  problem of temporary intrinsics. Though Lewis’s discussion may 
be taken as a further attempt to generate a puzzle about change, I argue that an alternative 
understanding of it is preferable. I conclude in section 3 that even if there are good reasons 
for focusing on the issue of change, they do not justify the widespread assumption that 
there is a puzzle about change that theories of persistence are intended to solve.
1. The problem with the puzzle of change. 
Many philosophers just find it natural to think of change as a puzzling phenomenon. As an 
example, see the following paragraph with which Achille Varzi opens a recent paper on a 
related topic:
Things change. Bananas ripen, houses deteriorate, people lose hairs and acquire 
new body cells. How can we say that they are the same things, if they are no 
longer  the  same?  What  grounds  our  belief  that  the  things  around  us  (and 
ourselves, too) may survive from day to day, in spite of the many changes that 
affect them? In this world of flux, persisting things are the only anchor we have, 
but the source of their persistence appears to be a genuine puzzle—a puzzle that 
has been with us since the Presocratics. (Varzi 2005, 485).
The fact that change is  a genuinely puzzling phenomenon is  presented here as a rather 
familiar fact, as something that could be taken for granted among philosophers – who are 
well  aware  of  it  since  the  very  beginning  of  their  discipline.  This  allows  Varzi  to  be 
relatively  succinct  when  explaining  what  exactly  the  puzzle  is,  and  to  summarize  the 
problem in the following concise question: how can we say of something that it is the same,  
if it is no longer the same? I will come back to this question at the end of this section. First, 
I want to contrast what I take to be Varzi’s attitude towards the problem of change with a 
different one, expressed by A. Bottani in the same journal and issue:  
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Philosophers have traditionally seen change as a paradoxical feature of reality, a 
source  of  great  ontological  puzzlement.  One  might  ask  why.  Why on  earth 
should such a natural, pervasive and uncontroversial phenomenon be treated as a 
philosophical paradox? (Bottani 2005, 381).
Bottani does think that there is a puzzle about change, but is reluctant to take it for granted. 
He realizes that there is an unavoidable difficulty in pinning down the puzzle of change, as 
he makes clear in the following passage:     
However clear it may be in its general meaning, the problem remains somewhat 
elusive, as one can realise as soon as one tries to make the problem transparent  
to the non-philosopher. For one might find it natural to ask: sure, no book can 
both have and lack the property of being closed at once, but why not at different 
times?  What  about  having  distinct  properties  at  distinct  times  does  look 
impossible or at least odd, and why? (Bottani 2005, 382)
In this paragraph, Bottani acknowledges that it  is not completely clear why change is a 
puzzling phenomenon,  and later  on he  proposes  to  remedy this  situation  by discussing 
different ways in which the problem could be stated. In this section 1, I will discuss some 
laborious attempts that philosophers have made in the same direction, trying to generate a 
puzzle about change.
First,  some neutral  terminology must  be  introduced.  I  will  say  that  an  object  x 
changes from time t1 to t2 with respect to the property expressed by a predicate ‘P’ iff x is P 
at t1 but not at t2 (or vice versa). So, for instance, a candle which is straight at t1 and bent at 
t2 changes with respect to bentness (and straightness) from t1 to t2. Some discussions focus 
on  intrinsic  change.  Intrinsic  change  occurs  when the  property expressed  by ‘P’ is  an 
intrinsic property of x, i.e. a property that x has just in virtue of how x is (for our purposes, 
this rough characterization of intrinsicness will suffice). A related recurrent notion is that of 
persistence.  Following Lewis (1986),  I  will  say that  an object  x persists iff  x exists  at 
different  times.  This  terminology –  which  is  relatively  standard  in  the  literature  about 
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change that I will discuss — allows for a pre-theoretical characterization of the phenomena. 
This  pre-theoretical  characterization  may  be  not  completely  perspicuous  once  we have 
adopted  some  particular  theoretical  commitments  about  what  properties,  or  time,  or 
persistence really are. To take just one example, our pre-theoretical characterization implies 
that nothing changes if it turns out that, as presentists believe, there really is just one time – 
the  present.  However,  it  is  a  good  policy  to  start  with  a  relatively  pre-theoretical 
characterization  of  change such as  the  one  I  have  offered  and then read  the  presentist 
characterization (or any other theoretical characterization) as refinements and corrections 
on it.      
Since my main contention in this paper is that there is no puzzle of change that does 
a good job in motivating  theories of persistence, it will also be helpful to briefly present 
here the two main such theories – which I call ‘standard perdurantism’ and ‘relations-to-
times  (RTT)  endurantism’ respectively. According to  standard perdurantism,  (i)  objects 
persist through time in virtue of having different temporal parts at each time in which they 
exist, and (ii) exemplify different properties at different times in virtue of their temporal 
parts  exemplifying those  properties  simpliciter.  Change is  therefore  a  matter of  having 
different temporal parts that exemplify different properties simpliciter. The other view that 
we  will  consider,  RTT-endurantism,  can  also  be  split  into  two  independent  theses:  (i) 
persisting objects are “wholly present” at each time in which they exist and do not have 
proper temporal parts, (ii) all temporary properties of persisting objects are in fact relations 
that they bear to times. Thus, change is a matter of bearing different relations to different 
times. Notice that both  standard perdurantism and  RTT-endurantism are “package views” 
that comprise a strictly ontological thesis about the existence of temporal parts, and a thesis 
about “temporal qualification”, i.e. of what it is for an object to have a property at a time. 
These package views are examples of what I generically call ‘theories of persistence’.  
 
Finally, we also need to agree about what counts as a puzzle. I will call a puzzle any 
set of English sentences that satisfy the following two requisites: (i) each of them, when 
considered independently of the rest,  appears to express a true proposition – i.e. to say 
something true; (ii) using uncontroversial rules of inference, a contradiction or an otherwise 
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patently false conclusion can be derived from the seemingly true propositions that we take 
the sentences to express. Typically, a good solution for a puzzle consists in showing which 
of the seemingly true propositions is not really true or not really the one expressed by the 
relevant sentence, and explaining why we get confused so easily in the first place. As we 
will see, this characterization is at least tacitly assumed by many philosophers who discuss 
the alleged puzzle of change. An important point to notice about this characterization is that 
it relies on the notion of a sentence’s appearing to express a true proposition. But of course, 
appearances  vary  greatly  among  individuals  and,  in  particular,  what  seems  true  to 
philosophers might not seem true to non-philosophers (and the other way around). As a 
result, we should regard being a puzzle as a relative matter, and we might think of a series 
of cases, ranging from the more “philosophical puzzles” to the less theoretical ones. At the 
first end of the spectrum we can locate those puzzles that arise only from the adoption of 
highly theoretical principles. At the opposite end, we find those puzzles that arise from very 
basic platitudes – propositions that seem true to any competent speaker. What I will  be 
arguing in what follows is that there is no puzzle of change to be located on any point of 
this scale – or at any rate, no puzzle of change that could motivate the adoption of the  
different theories of persistence.
Let us then consider a first attempt to generate a puzzle about change. This first 
attempt  appeals  explicitly  to  Leibniz’s  Law,  the  principle  according  to  which  if  x=y, 
everything which is true of x is true of y. A clear example of this strategy can be found in 
the following paragraph from T. Sider (2001):
[The] challenge is that persistence through change is inconsistent with Leibniz 
Law. (…) Consider any ordinary case of change.  Suppose I get  a haircut.  It 
would seem that the person before the haircut, call him Longhair, has different  
properties from the person, Shorthair, after the haircut; one has long hair while 
the other has short hair. Leibniz’s Law then seems to imply that Longhair and 
Shorthair are distinct, and thus that I do not survive the haircut, since the person 
after the haircut is not the same person as the person before the haircut. (Sider 
2001, 5)1
1 Bottani’s (2005) preferred statement of the puzzle is ultimately a generalization of this case. 
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Thus, change is puzzling because it implies that nothing that changes persists. Now, can we 
explicitly construe a puzzle, in the sense defined above, out of the case described by Sider? 
One suggestion is that the following sentences may qualify: 
(1) Longhair=Shorthair
(2) Longhair has long hair 
(3) Shorthair does not have long hair 
(4) Leibniz’s Law.
The suggestion is that given (2) and (3), which describe an ordinary case of change, either 
(1) or (4) have to go in order to avoid contradiction. Since both (1) and (4) seem undeniably  
true, we have a puzzle. However, this suggestion goes wrong. The reason why is simple, 
though the details may vary depending on one’s preferred view about propositions and the 
semantic  contribution  of  tense  and  temporal  modifiers.  Assuming  eternalism  about 
propositions and the view that tense is reducible to temporal indexicals, this is the reason 
why the present  proposal fails to generate a puzzle:2 sentences (2) and (3) are present-
tensed and, as a result, there is no single proposition expressed by them, but rather different  
propositions expressed in different contexts of utterance. Now, the  only proposition that 
may be taken as both true and expressed by (2) is that Longhair has long hair  before the  
haircut, whereas the only proposition that may be taken as both true and expressed by (3) is 
that Shorthair has short hair after the haircut. There are no other propositions in the vicinity 
that  may be taken to  be true and expressed by either  (2)  or (3).  But  then,  there is  no 
threatening contradiction behind them: the identity of Longhair with Shorthair is consistent 
2 For  the  case of  present-tensed  sentences  like (2)  and  (3),  the  idea  that  tense  is  reducible  to  temporal 
indexicals comes down to the view that that the present-tensed ‘a is P’ is equivalent to ‘∃t (t=now & a is P at 
t)’.  The clause ‘t=now’ in this analysis  should in  turn be understood along the lines of  the semantic for  
indexicals in Kaplan (1989), according to which the contribution of ‘now’ to the proposition expressed is just  
the  time  of  the  utterance.  Thus,  the  proposition  expressed  by  an  utterance  of  ‘a is  P’ is  an  ‘eternal 
proposition’, a proposition that cannot have different truth values relative to different times. This view on 
tense and propositions goes back to Frege and is nowadays very familiar, but its assumption is not required 
for dissolving the alleged puzzle of change. The puzzle also dissolves if we adopt the alternative “temporalist” 
view on propositions, the view according to which different utterances of the present-tensed ‘a is P’ express 
one single proposition that has different truth values relatively to different times. If this view is preferred,  
each  of  (2)  and  (3)  expresses  a  single  proposition,  but  there  is  no  single  time  relative  to  which  both  
propositions are true, and therefore no contradiction can be derived.
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with Longhair having long hair before the haircut and with Shorthair having shorthair after  
the haircut.3
Some comments about this argument are in order. First, I want to emphasize that the 
considerations above should not be taken as a solution to the alleged puzzle, but rather as 
showing that there is no puzzle in the first place. If we had a puzzle, a solution for it would 
consist  either  in  the  rejection of  at  least  one  of  the  seemingly  true  propositions,  or  in 
showing  that  at  least  one  of  those  seemingly  true  propositions  is  not  in  fact  the  one 
expressed by the relevant sentence. Someone who does think that there is a puzzle here may 
want to solve it by claiming, for instance, that Leibniz’s Law is not generally true, or that  
Longhair is not strictly identical to Shorthair. 
Second, all that is required for this dissolution of the puzzle is that we take the 
ordinary meaning of English sentences (2) and (3) at face value, taking into account the 
contribution  of  tense.  This  does  not imply  “taking  tense  seriously”  in  the  sense  of 
Zimmerman (1998), or adopting any sophisticated philosophical view about the nature of 
tense or time – such as the “tensed theory of time”, for instance. All that is required is that 
we give these English sentences their natural meaning. Perhaps a contradiction could be 
derived if we take (2) and (3) to be sentences in a regimented ‘tenseless’ language. But this 
would simply show that such a regimented language is not accurate enough to capture some 
basic  semantic  features  of  English.  It  would not  reveal  any deep problem for  which a 
metaphysics  of  change  is  required.  Moreover,  the  meaning  of  such  tenseless  language 
would have to be eventually explicated in English, and it is not clear that this can be done 
in a way such that sentences (1) to (4) will constitute a puzzle. Notice that two usual ways 
of understanding tenseless predication – what Zimmerman (2005) calls ‘always tenseless’ 
and  ‘sometimes  tenseless’ respectively  –  are  ruled  out.   Understood  as  an  “always-
tenseless” sentence, (2) means that Longhair has long hair at all times in which he exists, 
which is clearly false. Understood as “sometimes-tenseless”, (2) means that Longhair had, 
has or will have longhair, which is true but clearly not in conflict with a similar reading of 
(3).
3 For a similar point, see also Hansson (2007), p. 266-267.
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Third, it is worth noticing how the present case differs from others in which some 
non-evident context-sensitive element may be responsible for generating a puzzle. This is 
what happens, for instance, in the “paradoxes of coincidence” according to the counterpart 
theorist’s  diagnosis,  or  in  some  arguments  for  scepticism,  according  to  the  epistemic 
contextualist’s  diagnosis.4 If  it  is  true that  modal  and epistemic predicates  are  context-
sensitive, this is not completely evident for every competent speaker. This is why we are 
sometimes  misled  about  which  propositions  are  expressed  by  particular  utterances  of 
sentences containing those predicates, and this kind of confusion may produce a puzzle, in 
the sense defined above. But this does not happen with tensed verbs (and indexicals like 
‘here’, ‘this’, etc), the context sensitivity of which is  evident for competent speakers in a 
way that prevents them from ever being confused. 
Finally, we should mention a second and independent element in the wording of (2) 
and (3) which may contribute to generate the appearance of a puzzle. As the argument is 
presented in the passage quoted from Sider above, we are asked to introduce two names at 
two different  times –‘Longhair’ and ‘Shorthair’.  Even if  our instruction is  to  baptize a 
person, the fact that we have two names introduced at two different times may mislead us 
into thinking that we are thereby baptizing a person’s stages (if we think that such things 
exist). This confusion is further intensified by the suggestive descriptive character of the 
names chosen. Of course, a  stage theorist like Sider will be ready to admit that ordinary 
proper names refer to person-stages. But the alleged puzzle of change is intended to be 
independent of the adoption of stage theory: if anything, stage theory is supposed to be part 
of  the  solution  to  the  alleged  puzzle,  rather  than  an  assumption  required  for  its  mere 
formulation. 
In sum, the attempt to generate a puzzle by explicit appeal to Leibniz’s Law fails. 
Can we do better than this? S. Haslanger (2003) describes the puzzle of change as arising 
from the following five principles:5
4 See Lewis (1986) for the modal paradoxes of coincidence and Lewis (1996) for the contextualist treatment  
of the sceptical arguments.
5 Hinchliff (1996) and Wasserman (2006) offer versions of the puzzle that can be assimilated to Haslanger’s. 
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(1) Persistence condition: Objects persist through change.
(2)  Incompatibility  condition:  The  properties  involved  in  a  change  are 
incompatible. 
(3)  Law  of  non-contradiction:  Nothing  can  have  incompatible  properties,  i.e. 
nothing can be both P and not P.
(4) Identity condition: if an object persists through change, then the object existing 
before change is one and the same object as the one existing after the change; that 
is, the original object continues to exist through change.
(5)  Proper subject condition:  The object undergoing change is itself the proper 
subject of the properties involved in change. 
Assuming the definitions of ‘persistence’ and ‘change’ that I have offered above, 
conditions (4) and (5) are actually specifications of what is already expressed in (1): the 
identity condition is implicit in the idea of persistence, and the proper subject condition is 
implicit in the idea of change. 
As Haslanger points out, taken together these principles lead to contradiction: 
Suppose that [a] candle persists through [change from being straight to being 
bent]. That is to say that there is one thing, the candle, that is the proper subject 
of the property of straightness and of the property of bentness. But straightness 
and bentness are incompatible: nothing can be both straight and bent. In the face 
of  this  contradiction,  there  are  a  number  of  possible  conclusions  to  draw. 
Contrary to appearances, one of the principles we started with must be false. (p.  
317)
But do we really have a puzzle here? In order to qualify as a puzzle,  each of the five 
assumptions should be intuitively plausible when considered independently. In my opinion 
condition (3) fails to satisfy this requisite. It is intuitively not true that objects cannot have 
incompatible properties, like being bent and being not bent. What is intuitively true is that 
objects cannot have these incompatible properties at the same time – and actually it is for 
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this reason that they are incompatible.6 The negation of (3) is perfectly intuitively plausible: 
objects  can have incompatible  properties;  and of course they  do have them  at different  
times. It may be that (3) inherits undeserved credibility from the name that Haslanger has 
chosen for it: “Law of Non-contradiction”. It is therefore worth mentioning that in classical 
formulations, the  Law of Non-contradiction states exactly what intuitions allow, as in the 
following Aristotelian formulation: “It is impossible that the same thing should both belong 
and  not  belong  to  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  respect”7 The 
Aristotelian formulation  clearly  involves  a  temporal  qualification  that  is  not  present  in 
Haslanger’s third principle.
Also in this case, it is important to notice that by rejecting the initial plausibility of 
(3) we are not offering a solution to the alleged puzzle, but rather showing that there is no 
puzzle in the first place. Though (3) may be false, the relevant point here is that it does not 
seem true. This claim should be distinguished from the reaction of those who think that (3) 
does seem true (and thus, that  there is a puzzle here) but ultimately reject it  as a way of  
solving the alleged puzzle.   
At this point, I expect the following reaction: “of course objects can have different 
properties at different times, we all know that! The issue is  how they do this, and your 
dissolution of the puzzle does not help us with that.” This reply is frequent, and we find it 
very clearly stated by M. Hinchliff in “The Puzzle of Change”.8 After laying the premises 
of the alleged puzzle, Hinchliff acknowledges (as Bottani did) that the intended puzzle is 
somewhat elusive. This is how he makes the point:  
The solution to this puzzle may at first seem too obvious for it even to be a  
genuine puzzle: mention the distinct times at which the candle has its distinct  
shapes and declare the problem solved; for it is unproblematic that the candle is 
straight at t and bent at t’. This solution is correct but incomplete without an 
account  of  our  (…)  intuitions.  What  is  required  is  a  theory  of  temporal 
6 Cf. Hansson (2007), p. 269.
7 Aristotle Meta. Γ 3, 1005b 19-20, emphasis added. Cf. also Meta. Γ 6, 1011b 13-14 “The most certain of all 
principles is that contradictory sentences are not true at the same time” (emphasis added). 
8 Hinchliff (1996). Cf. also Hawley (2004), Sider (2001) p. 93.
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qualification which explains how change is possible while also accounting for 
the intuitions that generate the puzzle in the first place. (Hinchliff 1996, 119-
120). 
I presume someone like Hinchliff would dismiss our dissolution of Haslanger’s puzzle in 
terms like these: “what you say is correct but beside the point, or at best incomplete. You 
fail to offer the kind of account that is required for declaring the puzzle solved”. I agree that 
having a “theory of temporal qualification” is a desirable goal. My present point, however, 
is that we should not regard such a theory as a solution for an alleged puzzle about change 
because, as we have seen, there really is no such thing. Desirable as it might be, having a 
“theory of temporal qualification” is not required in order to account for “the intuitions that 
generate the puzzle”, as Hinchliff insists. Its motivation must lie somewhere else. 
We have already considered two major attempts to expose the puzzling character of 
change  and  found  both  of  them  unsuccessful.  Before  discussing  Lewis’s  problem  of 
temporary intrinsics, we can finally consider a third suggestion, expressed in the following 
paragraph by L. N. Oaklander:   
The problem of change, like all metaphysical problems arises out of a conflict of 
intuitions. On the one hand, change requires  sameness.  A thing that  changes 
must be one and the same both before and after the change, otherwise we have 
two things with different properties rather than one thing that changes. (…) On 
the other hand, change requires  difference. For if change is to occur, then the 
same apple must be what is not, since the apple must have a property, such as 
green, and then have a different and incompatible property, such as red. But how 
can one thing be the same and different? (Oaklander 2004, 20). 
This formulation of the problem brings us back to Varzi’s initial question: how can things 
be the same if they are different? Is it not contradictory to say that a thing is the same and 
not the same? Not in the present case: the appearance of a contradiction vanishes once we 
notice that ‘the same’ does not mean the same in both cases: it means  numerical identity 
when we say that the changing thing is the same, and it means qualitative identity when we 
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say that it is not the same. It may be that ordinary speakers of English are not fully aware 
that we are dealing here with two different meanings of ‘the same’. If so, then the present 
problem  does  count  as  a  puzzle,  in  the  sense  defined  above,  and  the  disambiguation 
proposed as a genuine solution to it.9 However,  this  puzzle  is  clearly irrelevant  for the 
debate about persistence and can hardly be used to motivate it. All that is required in order 
to solve this puzzle is to make the aforementioned distinction between two senses of ‘the 
same’ – the adoption of any metaphysical views about the nature of time, temporal parts, 
etc would be off the point.10 Since I am primarily concerned with attempts to motivate 
theories of persistence as solutions to an alleged puzzle of change, I will not consider the 
present problem in what follows, even if it does constitute a genuine puzzle according to 
our standards.  
2 The problem of temporary intrinsics. 
I turn now to the problem of temporary intrinsics (PTI, henceforth), which D. Lewis raises 
in an excursus from the main thread of On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis’s arguments are 
well known and have been subject of a long series of responses. I do not intend to discuss at 
length  this  well-established  debate,  but  rather  focus  on  those  aspects  of  it  which  are 
relevant  for  the  issue  at  hand,  namely  whether  there  is  something  like  a  puzzle about 
change. My central contention will be this: though the way Lewis and others present the 
PTI suggests that there might be a puzzle about intrinsic change, this is only a suggestion 
and  one  that  we  should  better  ignore.  Instead,  we  should  understand  the  PTI as  a 
metaphysical problem of a different sort: the metaphysical problem of explaining in very 
general terms how persisting objects undergo intrinsic change. This recommendation is in 
accordance with the general moral that I will draw from our discussion in the next section: 
philosophers of persistence should not pretend that they are solving a puzzle about change 
and should acknowledge that their efforts are still valuable even if there is no puzzle of 
change to solve.  
9 Thanks to a referee for dialectica for pointing this out.
10 Notice that the disambiguation move does accomplish what it is intended for: to show why, contrary to 
appearances, there is no contradiction in saying that the apple is the same and not the same. It can be argued 
in reply that the disambiguation does not go deep enough, given the intimate relation between numerical and 
qualitative identity (see Wasserman 2006). But this reply actually concedes that the real problem, if there is 
one, is not in the apparent contradiction that we are considering –that the real puzzle is rather to be construed 
in terms of either Sider’s or Haslanger’s versions discussed above.
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It  is natural to take Lewis’s discussion of the  PTI as just  one further attempt to 
generate a puzzle about change, with the focus on intrinsic change. In fact, this is suggested 
by how Lewis introduces the subject: “[the] problem of temporary intrinsics which is the 
traditional  problem of  change”.  (Lewis  1986,  202).  Many  philosophers  have  followed 
Lewis in this identification, taking the PTI as nothing but the old problem of change, with 
the minor peculiarity that the focus is made on  intrinsic change. (From this perspective, 
Lewis’s special interest in  intrinsic change in fact distracts from the more general issue, 
which concerns all kinds of change in the same way.11) Moreover, Lewis’s formulation of 
the problem actually invites the thought that we are facing a puzzle, in the sense we have 
defined. Consider the following two quotations: 
Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance, shape: when I sit 
I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are  
temporary intrinsics properties; I have them only some of the time. How is such 
change possible? I know of only three solutions. (…) (It is not a solution just to 
say how common place and indubitable it is that we have different shapes at 
different  times.  To say  that  is  to  insist  –  rightly  –  that  it  must  be  possible 
somehow (…). (Lewis 1986, 203-204)
Nothing can have the two incompatible  shapes,  bent  and straight.  How does 
having them at different times help? (Lewis 1988, 65).
In these two passages, the suggestion that we are facing a puzzle about change is reinforced 
by the  how-is-it-possible question and by Lewis’s talk of different ‘solutions’ that would 
explain how it is possible what seems otherwise impossible. But if there is a puzzle about  
intrinsic change, what is it exactly? What is the contradiction that we would be left with if 
none of the three solutions worked? The answer to these questions is not straightforward.  
Even if Lewis suggests that there is a threatening contradiction here, he does not state a 
11 Cf. Hawley p. 16: “the label [‘problem of temporary intrinsics’] is misleading for, as we will see, intrinsic  
change is not inherently more problematic than change in extrinsic features, and thus I will simply refer to the 
‘problem of change’”. See also Haslanger (2003), p. 329 and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Johnston (1987) also 
thinks that  the  PTI is  just  a particular  case  of the more general  problem, but he thinks that  focusing on 
intrinsic change helps to “more vividly illustrate” the general problem (p. 113). 
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puzzle explicitly, i.e. he does not lay out a set of seemingly true claims about intrinsic 
change  from  which  a  contradiction  could  be  derived.12 Instead,  what  he  offers  is  an 
objection against RTT-endurantism – an objection that I will discuss in a moment.
However, even if Lewis does not explicitly present a puzzle about intrinsic change, 
we may try to construe one along the following lines.13 We pointed out, in our discussion of 
Haslanger’s  argument,  that  there  is  nothing  intuitively  problematic  in  objects  having 
incompatible  properties at  different  times.  But  perhaps  the  problem  could  be  pushed 
forward if the properties in question are intrinsic. It may be argued that if P is an intrinsic 
property, no object can both have and lack P, even at different times. Suppose otherwise: P 
is intrinsic and x has P at t1 and it lacks P at t2. Given that P is intrinsic to x, x’s having P 
should depend only on how x is; this is what being intrinsic means. However, in the present 
case, x’s having P does not depend only on x (which both has and lacks P). It also depends 
on which time we are considering. So, contrary to our initial assumption, P is not intrinsic 
after all.
 
On my view, this argument rests on a mistaken assumption, and this is the reason 
why it also fails to ultimately constitute a puzzle. The assumption in question is that the 
time at which a property is temporarily had is necessarily something on which the having of  
the property depends. But in general, that x has P at t1 and not at t2 does not imply that x’s 
having P depends on  t1 (or  t2). It may still well be that  x’s having P does not depend on 
anything other than “how x is”, and thus be intrinsic to x. For instance, a persisting candle 
that is straight only at t1 is arguably straight and not straight (at different times) in virtue of 
how it is – the particular time at which it is straight does not play any role in determining 
that it is so. In sum, being had at a time does not make a property extrinsic. And since there 
is no problem in having incompatible properties  at different times, there is no problem in 
12 At least, he does not do so in his (1986), (1988), and other discussions of the PTI, such as Lewis (2002). But 
in  the  introduction  to  his  Papers  in  Metaphysics  and  Epistemology he  writes:  “if  something  endures 
identically through time while gaining or losing an intrinsic property, we have a prima facie contradiction: the 
very same thing both has and lacks an intrinsic property” (p 3). In this passage, it appears that Lewis identifies  
the PTI with a puzzle like Haslanger’s. Thanks to a referee for dialectica for pointing to this passage.
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for  dialectica for urging me to consider the following argument. It  is 
doubtful,  though,  that  this  argument  is  what  Lewis  had  in  mind.  See  Wasserman  2003,  section  II  for 
discussion of this last point.
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x’s being P at  t1 and not being P at  t2, even when P is intrinsic. Once again, this is not a 
puzzle that might motivate the adoption of a theory of persistence. 
Fortunately, we do not need to suppose that there really is a puzzle about intrinsic 
change in order to make sense of Lewis’s discussion. Instead of talking about “solutions” 
that explain how something (otherwise impossible) is possible, Lewis might well have said: 
“I know of only three general descriptions of what happens whenever I change my shape”. 
This  alternative  way  of  talking  does  not  carry  the  implication  that  the  phenomenon 
described is puzzling, or that the three competing descriptions are offered as ways out from 
contradiction. We can take the views just as very general explanations or descriptions of 
what happens when an object changes its intrinsic properties. And we can take the PTI as 
the demand of such an explanation or description, but one that is not based on the threat of 
paradox. 
Before closing this section, I would like to take care of a loose end: as mentioned 
above, much of Lewis’s discussion of the PTI is actually devoted to lay down a particular 
objection against RTT-endurantism. The objection is that RTT-endurantism misconstrues 
the real nature of some intrinsic properties, like shapes: we know, according to Lewis, that 
shapes are monadic properties and not relations, as they would be if RTT-endurantism were 
true.  Now,  someone  might  suggest  that  this  objection  itself constitutes  a  puzzle  about 
intrinsic change: it may be said that  the RTT-endurantist  faces a puzzle if  she wants to 
accommodate  the  alleged  intuition  that  shapes  are  monadic  properties,  because  this 
intuition is obviously prima facie incompatible with her view. But even if this may be a 
puzzle after all, it is not the one we were interested in the first place: it cannot be identified 
with the traditional problem of change or with the PTI, because under the assumption that 
these were puzzles, RTT-endurantism was supposed to be a solution rather than part of the 
problem. Another difference with the alleged puzzles considered in section 1 is that, unlike 
them,  Lewis’s  objection  to  RTT-endurance  relies  on  a  very  sophisticated  metaphysical 
intuition. The claim that shapes are monadic properties (not to be conflated with the claim 
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that predicates for shapes are monadic) is arguably not supported by any ordinary intuition 
– it is rather a highly theoretical claim about which ordinary speakers know nothing about.14 So even if Lewis’s objection might be considered as a puzzle, it is worth noticing how far away it is from the seemingly platitudinous principles that are thought to generate the alleged puzzle of change, as in the versions of it already discussed.
This diagnosis of Lewis’s objection to RTT-endurantism (that it cannot be identified 
with the PTI itself, and that it is relies on highly theoretical assumptions) also applies to a 
related objection against endurance that is considered and dismissed by R. Kurtz (2006). 
Unlike Lewis’s original objection,  this second objection is based on a general principle 
rather than on intuitions about the nature of particular properties. This general principle is 
what Kurtz calls ‘Atemporal Instantiation’ (AI), and states as follows: 
(AI): If an object is the proper subject of a property, then (i) the object has that 
property,  and  (ii)  facts  about  time  and  tense  are  irrelevant  to  the  truth  of  the 
proposition that the object has that property. (Kurtz 2006, 13)
Now,  as  before,  we  can  say  that  the  RTT-endurantist  faces  a  puzzle  if  she  tries  to 
accommodate  AI  with  her  account  of  persistence  and  change,  since  AI  rules  out  her 
proposed model of property exemplification. (Notice that Kurtz intends AI to rule out even 
the possibility that a book be the proper subject of “time-indexed” properties, like  being 
open at t1.) But, again, this is a puzzle in which RTT-endurantism is part of the problem 
rather  than  a  solution  to  it.  Moreover,  the  principle  does  not  seem to  follow from an 
ordinary conception of what it is for an object to instantiate a property, since we ordinarily 
think of objects as having their properties at times. We think of the property of being open 
as something that is had by the book (its proper subject)  at some times in which it exists 
rather than atemporally – a fact of ordinary thought that is reflected in language by the 
presence of tense. Is there any  theoretical motivation for AI? One such motivation may 
come from a certain view about the nature of  fundamental  properties, i.e. the most basic 
properties on which all other properties supervene. It may be argued that even if AI is not 
generally true, a restricted version of it concerning only fundamental intrinsic properties is. 
That  is  to  say,  even  if  most  of  the  properties  attributed  by  ordinary  predication  are 
temporally instantiated, fundamental properties are instantiated atemporally, in the sense 
14 For discussion of this point see Haslanger (2003), Sider (2001) and Wasserman (2003)
16
specified by AI; temporal instantiation cannot go all the way down to properties belonging 
to the most fundamental level.15 If this conception of fundamental properties is adopted, the 
objection  to  RTT-endurantism  may  then  be  valid,  but  it  would  be  the  result  of  a 
sophisticated metaphysical view of the nature of fundamental properties, rather than just 
some  platitudes  about  change.  Thus,  and  as  we  said  with  respect  to  Lewis’s  original 
objection,  the  present  objection  to  endurance  cannot  be  identified  with  the  traditional 
puzzle of change. 
3. Conclusions.
We have considered some major attempts to generate a puzzle about change that could 
motivate the debate about persistence, and found them wanting. Contrary to what many 
philosophers seem to believe, change is not a puzzling phenomenon. It may be thought that 
this leaves theories of persistence ill-founded or lacking any real motivation. I do not think 
this is the case, as I will explain in what follows.  
It  seems  that  the  reason  why  the  phenomenon  of  change  has  attracted  the 
philosopher’s  attention  is  that  it  cross-cuts  many  issues  of  independent  philosophical 
interest (see Wasserman 2006). The list includes issues about the existence of temporal 
parts, about temporal qualification (i.e., about what it is for an object to have a property at a 
time), and about the nature of time. It is undeniable that all of these issues are prima facie 
of genuine interest by themselves, and that the different views that one could take about 
them  will  determine  how  one  thinks  about  change.  Thus,  one  can  thus  focus  on  the 
phenomenon  of  change  as  a  starting  point  for  discussion  of  the  different  views  about 
15 Something like this may have been Lewis’s own view. Lewis (2002) clearly states that he has 
nothing to object to “time-indexed” properties like being bent at t as long as ‘they are not alleged to 
be  fundamental  properties  of  the  sort  that  might  figure  in  a  minimal  basis  on  which  all  else  
supervenes’ (p. 4). This suggests that Lewis’s objection to RTT-endurantism may ultimately depend 
on certain conception of fundamental properties – one that may be captured by a restricted version 
of AI. It is clear that on the Lewisian picture, fundamental properties satisfy AI: these properties are 
exemplified by instantaneous stages and as a result, “facts about time and tense” are irrelevant to  
the truth of the proposition that a given such property is exemplified. What is not so clear is whether 
there is any motivation for this restricted version of AI that is independent of the adoption of the 
ontology  of  instantaneous  stages,  and  thus  dialectically  appropriate  in  an  argument  against  
endurantism. The desire to have an austere repertoire of fundamental properties may be one such  
motivation, but of course this austerity at the level of fundamental properties is compensated by 
overpopulation at the level of individuals.
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temporal qualification, temporal parts, time, etc. This is probably a fruitful strategy, but it 
does not justify the idea that there is a puzzle about change, for which the views under 
consideration  are  a  solution.  The phenomenon of  change can still  be  considered as  an 
especially interesting junction point, even if there is no puzzle there to solve. 
This said, one might think that the puzzle of change is a useful fiction. That is to 
say, even if there is no puzzle of change, the pretension that there is one may be useful for 
presenting, classifying and discussing the different philosophical views that, as we have just 
noticed, have some bearing on how we think about the phenomenon of change. I would like 
to point out some limitations of this strategy. First,  this way of presenting the different 
views about persistence and time makes them appear less well motivated than they actually 
are. To take just a couple of examples, the adoption of views like presentism or standard 
perdurantism is likely to be deemed as an overreaction to the problem of avoiding the 
contradiction  lurking  in  the  alleged  puzzle  of  change.  The  alleged  puzzle  seems 
immediately too easy to solve, independently of the adoption of those (perhaps) radical 
philosophical views. Second, the pretension that there is a puzzle about change may be 
responsible for a certain bias in the contemporary discussion of change, in particular for the 
fact that this discussion has focused excessively on the restricted phenomenon of intrinsic  
change, in detriment of non-intrinsic change and  mere persistence – persistence without 
change. My guess is that it was mainly the interest in generating a puzzle that has relegated 
these phenomena to a secondary position: compared with intrinsic change, non-intrinsic 
change and mere persistence were probably considered less likely to generate a puzzle, and 
thus less worthy of attention.16 But as we have noted above, at the end of the day, many 
philosophers think that non-intrinsic change is as worthy of attention as intrinsic change. 
Moreover, many also acknowledge that the issue of temporal qualification itself is what 
really  interests  them when  they  discuss  the  problem of  change.17 Thus,  giving  up  the 
pretension that there is a  puzzle of change helps to bring these phenomena (non-intrinsic 
16 A clear example of this is given by Johnston’s remarks above to the effect that focusing on intrinsic change  
helps to “more vividly illustrate” the general problem of change. It is clear in Johnston’s discussion that by 
“vivid illustration” he means a puzzle, in the sense defined above. See Johnston (1987) p. 113.
17  Cf. Hawley (2001), p. 16: “I will simply refer to the ‘problem of change’. But the underlying issue is not 
specifically about change. Rather, it is about what underpins our talk about objects as they are at different  
times—what, if anything, can we say about how a persisting object atemporally is, and how does this relate to 
our talk about how the object is at different times”. 
18
change, temporal qualification) back as legitimate explananda alongside intrinsic change, a 
result that will be welcomed by most philosophers of persistence. 
In sum, nothing justifies the pretension that there is a puzzle about change. A final 
point to notice is that, even if there is no puzzle of change, there remain some other puzzles 
that somehow or other involve change. As an example, consider the famous puzzles based 
on the story of the ship or Theseus, the Parfitian cases of fission and fusion, and even the  
“temporal  versions”  of  the  puzzles  of  material  constitution.  Nothing  I  have  said  here 
undermines the idea that these are real puzzles. But they are not puzzles about change, or 
not only about change, since they crucially depend on assumptions (about ships, persons, 
the possibility of co-location, etc) that go far beyond Leibniz’s Law and the fact that objects 
persist and change over time.18 
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